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Abstract 
In this commentary, the author reviews methodological and conceptual shortcomings of 
recent articles by K. D. Drummond, S. J. Bradley, M. Peterson-Badali, and K. J. Zucker 
(2008) as well as G. Rieger, J. A. W. Linsenmeier, L. Gygax, and J. M. Bailey (2008), which 
sought to predict adult sexual identity from childhood gender identity. The author argues that 
such research needs to incorporate a greater awareness of how stigmatization affects 
identity processes. Multidimensional models of gender identity that describe variation in 
children’s responses to pressure to conform to gender norms are particularly useful in this 
regard (S. K. Egan & D. G. Perry, 2001). Experiments on the interpretation of developmental 
data are reviewed to evidence how cultural assumptions about sexuality can impact theories 
of sexual identity development in unintended ways. The author concludes that understanding 
the development of children presumed most likely to grow up with sexual minority identities 
requires a consideration of the cultural contexts in which identities develop and in which 
psychologists theorize. 
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A recent special section of Developmental Psychology (Vol. 44, pp. 1–138) illustrates that 
developmental interest in sexual identity has “never been greater than it is today” (Patterson, 
2008, p. 1).  Over the last 35 years, the shift from a disease paradigm to a stigma paradigm 
in psychology has increased psychologists’ understanding of the external risk factors and the 
internal strengths that shape sexual minority identity development in social contexts that are 
characterized by prejudice (Meyer, 2003). That paradigm shift involved the recognition of 
early nonpathologizing research (e.g., Hooker, 1957), the emergence of the modern lesbian 
and gay rights movement, the 1973 vote by the members of the American Psychiatric 
Association to de-pathologize homosexuality, and the subsequent resolution by the 
American Psychological Association for “all mental health professionals to take the lead in 
removing the stigma of mental illness that has long been associated with homosexual 
orientations” (Conger, 1975, p. 633; also see Bayer, 1981).  As in any scientific revolution, 
old questions were abandoned for newer ones (Kuhn, 1970). Interest in the clinical 
assessment, psychological adjustment, and causes of homosexuality waned, and attention 
focused on many aspects of lesbian, gay, and bisexual lives that the disease paradigm had 
obscured, including stigmatization processes and adjustment to heterosexist societies (see 
Morin, 1977; Watters, 1986). 
 
For the purposes of this article, I describe research that attributes particular features of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) development to the influence of external 
stigmatization processes rather than inherent pathological factors as operating within a 
stigma paradigm. The shift to this paradigm has been incomplete; ego-dystonic 
homosexuality remained in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd 
ed.; DSM–III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980), and sexual disorder not otherwise 
specified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM–IV; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) still affords the diagnosis of unwanted 
homosexuality (Zucker & Spitzer, 2005). Moreover, cultural values always influence science, 
even in the stigma paradigm (e.g., Hegarty & Massey, 2006; Kitzinger, 2004) in which some 
groups have been foregrounded more than others. For example, research in the stigma 
paradigm has focused on men (Lee & Crawford, 2007), making recent models that center on 
women’s sexuality particularly welcome (e.g., Diamond, 2008; Thompson & Morgan, 2008). 
The stigma paradigm has also been applied primarily to adults and only rarely to children. 
The special section includes a study of the effects of stigmatization on adolescents who 
question their heterosexuality (Bos, Sandfort, de-Bruyn, & Hakvoort, 2008), but children 
who break gender norms were studied with the goal of predicting their adult sexual and 
gender identities and with little regard to the stigmatization that those identities might attract 
(Drummond, Bradley, Peterson-Badali, & Zucker, 2008; Rieger, Linsenmeier, Gygax, & 
Bailey, 2008). 
 
These last two articles form part of a research tradition that has been little informed by the 
stigma paradigm. I call this paradigm the gender identity disorder in childhood (GIDC) 
paradigm. In an earlier meta-analysis, the senior authors of Drummond et al.’s (2008) and 
Rieger et al.’s (2008) articles examined how adults of diverse sexual identities recalled the 
gender conformity of their childhood experiences (Bailey & Zucker, 1995). In the earliest and 
largest retrospective study [page 896] that defined this paradigm, straight [Note1] adults 
reported more conformity than their sexual minority counterparts, and this effect was 
strongest among men and Whites (Bell, Weinberg, & Hammersmith, 1981). Bailey and 
Zucker (1995) similarly concluded that adult sexual identity predicted recall of childhood 
gender best among men, but they did not examine whether this trend varied across ethnic 
groups. Both Rieger et al. and Drummond et al. presented work within this tradition, and the 
coexistence of the GIDC and stigma paradigms exemplifies how multiple paradigms 
can operate concurrently in psychology (Driver-Linn, 2003). 
 
Why do these paradigms remain separate? First, affirmative psychologists have only rarely 
examined how sexual identity based stigma affects children who break gender norms (e.g., 
Hill & Willoughby, 2005; Martin, 1995). Second, both Bell et al.’s (1981) study and the 
canonical prospective study linking childhood gender role to adult sexual identity (Green, 
1987) were initiated prior to the de-pathologizing of homosexuality, but both were published 
some years later. Third, lesbian and gay activists who protested the diagnosis of adult 
homosexuality were absent from the later debates that shaped the diagnosis of GIDC, which 
defines some children as mentally ill as a result of their gendered behaviour (Bryant, 2006). 
Fourth, advocates of the GIDC paradigm have often dismissed their many critics who argue 
that gender is, at least in part, socially constructed and that gender variance is no grounds 
for a psychiatric diagnosis— often without regard for the merit in their critiques (see, e.g., 
Bradley & Zucker, 1998; Zucker, 1997; Zucker & Spitzer, 2005). 
 
Sandford (2005) further noted that researchers in the stigma paradigm are often averse to 
research that emerges from retrospective and prospective studies linking children who break 
gender norms with sexual minority adults (see, e.g., Hill, Rozanski, Carfagnini, & Willoughby, 
2005; Minter, 1999; Paul, 1993). By closely attending to the recent articles by Drummond et 
al. (2008) and Rieger et al. (2008), I hope to explain such aversion and to suggest how the 
stigma paradigm could assist the understanding of the development of those children who—
according to the scientists who study them most determinedly—are most likely to be grow up 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. A switch away from conceptualizing gender as 
essentially a masculinity–femininity (MF) personality dimension, toward multidimensional 
models of gender identity that allow for individual variation in the interpretation of gender-
related behaviors, will be key to this paradigm shift (Egan & Perry, 2001). Like all arguments 
about paradigm shifts, mine assumes that different interpretations can be made of the same 
data depending on the prevailing theoretical framework. Accordingly, I also return to 
Hegarty’s (1999) experiments to show how unacknowledged cultural knowledge affects the 
explanation of data about the development of sexual identity.  
 
Rieger et al. (2008): A Critique 
Childhood gender nonconformity is recalled by only some adults with sexual minority 
identities (e.g., Diamond, 1998; Savin- Williams, 1998), and many straight women recall 
tomboy pasts (Hyde, Rosenberg, & Behrman, 1977). Retrospective studies in this domain 
are vulnerable to the obvious criticism that people systematically misremember the past 
(see, e.g., Gottschalk, 2003; Paul, 1993; Ross, 1980). As a clever response to this problem, 
Rieger et al. (2008) asked raters to watch video clips of lesbian, gay, and straight adults as 
children and as adults. Participants completed self-report measures of MF both for their 
current adult selves and for their past childhood selves. Straight participants judged 
themselves, and were judged by others, to be more gender conforming than their lesbian 
and gay counterparts, both as adults and as children. Rieger et al. presented these results 
as supporting earlier retrospective studies (e.g., Bailey & Zucker, 1995) and interpreted 
positive correlations between MF measures as evidence that there is an “essence” to this 
dimension that varies systematically across sexual identity groups (p. 54). 
 
This last conclusion is overstated. For the childhood period, gay men’s self-reported MF was 
significantly correlated with observers’ ratings ( p < .05), but the scores of all other groups 
were not (all ps > .05). For adulthood, only straight men’s self-reported and observer-rated 
MF scores were significantly correlated ( p < .05). Those of all other groups were not (all ps 
> .05). Self-reported adult MF and observer-rated childhood MF were correlated for men 
only. To support the argument that these moderate relationships between self-report and 
observer ratings evidence an MF personality dimension, Rieger et al. (2008) cited Pedhazur 
and Tetenbaum (1979). However, those authors also found only a weak relationship 
between self-reported masculinity, femininity, and other gender-related traits. 
 
Rieger et al. (2008) evidenced an awareness that their correlational results fell short of 
support for a one-dimensional MF model when they attributed the nonsignificant correlations 
between the MF scores to low statistical power. They also averaged correlations between all 
possible MF scores, and when these averaged correlations did not differ significantly by 
group, they were interpreted as further evidence that the one-dimensional MF model applied 
equally well across all groups. However, averaged correlations between MF scores were 
somewhat higher among straight and gay men (rs = .46 and .32, respectively) than among 
lesbian and straight women (rs = .24 and .25, respectively). Tellingly, the authors did not 
conjecture whether a more powerful study might have yielded significant gender differences 
in the strength of these correlations. Such a finding would, of course, suggest that the MF 
model works best among men (see Rieger et al., 2008, p. 52). 
 
Although the authors’ interpretations of their correlations between MF scores are unusual, 
such moderate correlations are precisely what multidimensional models of gender identity 
would predict (e.g., Egan & Perry, 2001; Spence, 1985). MF models and androgyny 
measures (e.g., Bem, 1996) share the assumption that the masculinity and femininity of 
traits and behaviors are relatively fixed. In contrast, multidimensional models assume that 
people use gendered behavior to form subjective impressions of MF in variable ways, 
leading to moderate, variable relationships between MF ratings and specific behaviors. 
Longitudinal research in which multidimensional models were used suggests how the kind of 
retrospective studies reviewed by Bailey and Zucker (1995) might be improved by stepping 
outside of the MF model. For example, Carver, Egan, and Perry (2004) found that children 
who question their heterosexuality engage in fewer same-sex activities than their peers, but 
they do not engage in a greater number of opposite-sex [page897] activities. Such children 
also come to see themselves as more atypically gendered as a consequence of questioning 
their heterosexuality. Researchers who seek to understand when people correctly or falsely 
remember the gendered behaviors of their childhood would do well to study such identity 
processes. 
 
Ironically, Rieger et al.’s (2008) new methodology casts doubt on the earlier retrospective 
studies reviewed by Bailey and Zucker (1995); only gay male adults, it seems, can be 
trusted to recall their childhoods with an accuracy approaching that of videotape. Rieger et 
al.’s results do not fit an MF model, but they do fit a multidimensional model that assumes 
that people perceive others’ genders quite differently from the ways that they perceive their 
own (see also Spence, 1985). More generally, the items used by Rieger et al. routinely 
constructed masculinity and femininity as opposites. For example, the observers rated the 
videos using a scale anchored by the terms masculinity and femininity, and self-report items 
presented masculine and feminine behaviors as mutually exclusive (e.g., “As a child I 
preferred playing with girls than with boys”). As a result, Rieger et al. assumed, but could not 
test, that masculinity and femininity are persistently perceived as logical opposites by 
ordinary people. 
 
Drummond et al. (2008): A Critique 
Concerns about memory distortion were less pressing for Drummond et al. (2008); these 
authors used a longitudinal design to study the link between childhood gender identity and 
adult sexual and gender identity prospectively. Unlike earlier, larger prospectivestudies of 
boys (e.g., Green, 1987), Drummond et al. asked whether girls labeled with GIDC would 
take on sexual and gender minority identities as adults. Few did, but more did than 
population estimates would predict. These authors accessed the files of the world’s largest 
clinic for children diagnosed with GIDC. Only 71 girls altogether were referred to this clinic 
for GIDC between 1975 and 2004, and only 36 of these were above the cutoff of 17 years 
required for study participation. Another participant was contacted opportunistically. Of these 
37 eligible people, only 25 were contactable, and only 15 had met the threshold for a GIDC 
diagnosis in childhood. The difficulties surpassed in constructing this sample show how 
firmly the GIDC paradigm is focused on boys, and how rarely it is applied to girls; GIDC is 
largely a diagnosis of atypical femininity and only rarely a diagnosis of atypical masculinity. 
 
Drummond et al. (2008) and Rieger et al. (2008) share the assumption that the clinical 
literature on GIDC can serve as a model for the development of minority sexual identity more 
generally. Drummond et al. noted that their data show “at least some convergence with data 
from retrospective studies” (pp. 42–43), whereas Rieger et al. motivated their study with the 
question of “how much the findings” of prospective studies “generalize to the development of 
most homosexual people” (p. 47). LGBT affirmative theorists’ reluctance to draw on this work 
(see Sandford, 2005) may be due to its reliance on medicalizing language when talking 
about sexual and gender minorities. Drummond et al.’s study fails to take the lead “in 
removing the stigma of mental illness that has long been associated with homosexual 
orientations” (Conger, 1975, p. 633). Instead, Drummond et al. conflate statistically common 
gender patterns with normativity in their first sentence (p. 34); describe “girls with potential 
problems in their sexual identity development” prior to describing those girls’ likelihood of 
growing up lesbian, bisexual, or transgender (p. 42); describe the breaking of gender norms 
as a risk factor for adult transgender status (p. 42); and note that a high “dosage” of gender 
transgression is likely to cause bisexual and lesbian identities (p. 43). Rieger et al. did not 
use such medicalized language, but by citing such GIDC work as the framework they wished 
to extend to understand sexual identity development more generally, their work might 
similarly augment stigma against LGBT people rather than attenuate it. Of course, work 
within the GIDC paradigm is also in tension with the increasing number of emerging 
analyses of the stigma experienced by transgender adults (e.g., Clements-Nolle, Marx, & 
Katz, 2006; Grossman & D’Augelli, 2007; Hill & Willoughby, 2005; Lombardi, Wilchins, 
Priesing, & Malouf, 2001; Tee & Hegarty, 2006). 
 
Again, multidimensional models of gender identity suggest where useful alternatives to the 
GIDC paradigm might lie. Egan and Perry’s (2001) model predicts that children who break 
gender norms are not intrinsically maladjusted, as the psychiatric diagnosis of GIDC 
presumes. Indeed, among these children, those that feel less pressure to conform to gender 
roles fare the best (Yunger, Carver, & Perry, 2004). The diagnosis of GIDC assumes that 
children experience distress, but negative reactions to children’s gender nonconformity 
magnify that distress as the multidimensional model would predict (Cohen-Kettenis, Owen, 
Kaijser, Bradley, & Zucker, 2003; Zucker & Bradley, 1995, pp. 108–110). As Lev (2005) has 
noted, to the extent that children’s feelings of distress come from external sources, the GIDC 
diagnosis is inconsistent with DSM criteria that specify that psychiatric distress must result 
from inherent pathology rather than reactions to social deviance (see also Hird, 2003; 
Wilson, Griffin, & Wren, 2002).  Indeed, attributing GIDC to a child, or delivering therapy 
aimed at reinforcing conformity to gender norms (e.g., Green, 1987; Zucker & Bradley, 
1995), may augment the pressure children feel to conform to gender norms. As such, the 
GIDC model may undermine, rather than support, that child’s well-being, as critics of the 
diagnosis have long argued (e.g., Sedgwick, 1991). 
 
Stigma researchers may also be averse to GIDC work because more recent psychiatric 
alternatives acknowledge the possibility that acceptance of children’s atypical gender 
behavior might promote their well-being. Menvielle and Tuerk (2002) have interpreted 
evidence of developmental links between childhood gender conformity and adult sexual 
identity as an ethical imperative to assist parents to develop less heterosexist and more 
gender inclusive scripts for family life. Their interventions assume that all children, 
particularly boys, are vulnerable to homophobia and that acceptance of gender variant 
behaviors supports well-being among gender nonconforming children (cf. Carver et al., 
2004; Yunger et al., 2004). Consistent with research on the effectiveness of lesbian and gay 
parents (e.g., Patterson, 2006) and the experiences recounted by their children (Goldberg, 
2007; Saffron, 1998), Menvielle and Tuerk have recognized that adherence to gender norms 
is not essential to familial well-being. Finally, the intervention does not posit an “essence” to 
MF but recognizes that gender nonconformity may persist or desist and may lead to 
gay/lesbian, bisexual, or straight adult identities (cf. Carver et al., 2004). In short, the 
intervention is interested in the child’s well-being, understands familial bonds to be key to 
that well-being, and disattends to anxious questions about the child’s eventual gender [page 
898] identity or sexual identity on the basis of his or her current gender nonconformity. 
 
Who Needs To Be Explained? 
In arguing for a paradigm shift in both research and clinical practice around children who 
break gender norms, I have assumed Kuhn’s (1970) premise throughout, that data about 
children can be interpreted differently within different paradigms and that such paradigms 
can be shaped by larger cultural contexts. For this reason, it was particularly disappointing 
that Drummond et al. (2008, p. 35) cited my unpublished dissertation (Hegarty, 1999) as an 
argument that “the sex-typed behavior-sexual orientation association is nothing more than 
participants recalling behaviors that adhere to cultural stereotypes and expectations.” 
Contrary to this suggestion, Hegarty (1999) reported inconsistent results about effects of 
cultural expectations on straight students’ memories (see Hegarty, 2001, for a discussion). 
However, published experiments from that dissertation (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; see also 
Hegarty & Pratto, 2004) showed the effects of cultural meaning systems on data 
interpretation with regard to retrospective recall studies. 
 
In those experiments, undergraduates explained, in their own words, the results of 
retrospective studies linking adult sexual identity to childhood gendered behavior. 
Explanations overwhelmingly took lesbian and gay development as the effect to be 
explained, and heterosexual development as the implicit norm, even when straight adults 
were described as recalling childhood gender transgressions. Only when explicitly instructed 
to do so did participants write explanations that focused explicitly on straight people. These 
experiments evidence heteronormative thinking (Butler, 1990; Warner, 1993)—the tendency 
to conflate heterosexuality with the way people universally are and will universally remain. 
Similar studies show that men and White people are taken as the implicit norm when gender 
and race differences are explained (Hegarty & Buechel, 2006; Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991; 
Pratto, Hegarty, & Korchmairos, 2007).  
 
Spontaneous explanations of retrospective studies were further shaped by stereotypes 
(Hegarty & Pratto, 2001, 2004). When participants were told that gay men or lesbians 
recalled childhood nonconformity, participants’ explanations largely assumed that childhood 
behavior had been accurately recalled. However, even when straight adults were said to 
recall gender nonconformity, explanations remained focused on lesbians and gay men and 
now specified that gay men or lesbians had lied, misremembered their past, or otherwise 
reconstructed their past experiences. Hegarty (1999) did not present evidence that culture 
impacted the way that sexual minority people recall their childhoods as Drummond et al. 
(2008) suggested (but see Carver et al., 2004). Rather the published studies from that 
dissertation clearly show that cultural stereotypes and expectations lead people to invoke the 
question of memory bias selectively when they are presented with results that do not 
conform to their stereotypes. 
 
These asymmetric patterns of explanation are important because many authors delineate 
good from bad developmental science on sexual identity on the basis of whether research 
“treats heterosexuality, bisexuality and homosexuality as equally requiring explanation” 
or “seeks a cause only for homosexuality and omits heterosexuality from the investigation” 
(Herek, Kimmel, Amaro, & Melton, 1991, p. 958; for similar statements, see Bem, 1996; 
Freud, 1905; Zucker & Bradley, 1995). However, heteronormativity can affect scientific 
explanations in spite of our best intentions (Hegarty, 2007). Bell et al. (1981) similarly argued 
that “any parsimonious and valid scientific explanation must account for the rule as well as 
the exception” and that “any satisfactory theory of sexual orientation must explain with equal 
ease both the majority pattern, heterosexuality, and the less-common homosexual pattern” 
(p. xi). However, the explanations of group differences in their canonical book focused on 
sexual minority groups more than sexual majority groups by a ratio of 3:1—much like those 
of experimental participants (see Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Bell et al. are not unusual in this 
regard. Heteronormativity also frames developmental explanations of sexual identity in 
popular journalism (Hegarty, 2003) and psychology textbooks (Barker, 2007). 
 
Conclusion 
Explanations of developmental processes that focus selectively on lesbians, gay men, or 
bisexual people are not just influenced by the larger heteronormative culture. Rather, as 
developmental psychologists continue to theorize sexual-identity-related differences in ways 
that favor heterosexuality (Savin-Williams, 2008), those explanations also influence and 
reinforce that culture. Questions about the causes of homosexuality are not “closely 
associated with technologies that have attempted to correct or prevent the development of 
the ‘condition’” as they once were (Morin, 1977, p. 633). However, heterosexual 
development is all too easily taken to be the implicit benchmark for sexual development 
rather than one-among-many sexual identities that healthy people grow into. Like the 
children of LGBT parents, some developmental psychologists are increasingly recognizing 
that widening the range of gender roles that are taken as normal may have benefits for all 
(see, e.g., Eisenberg, Martin, & Fabes, 1996). This recognition implies that any greater 
gender role flexibility afforded by LGBT identities and communities might become a valued 
resource for healthy development rather than an anomaly to explain, a “dosage effect”, or a 
natural experiment to explore whether gender is essentially tied to sexual identity. We will 
not get the measure of the developmental relationships between sexuality, gender, and well-
being by repetitively deploying an MF thermometer to predict adult sexual identity as an 
outcome variable. Instead, we need to see growing people as actively managing 
relationships between their behavioral preferences, emergent sexual identities, and the 
double bind between performing gender in accord with heterosexual norms and risking the 
consequences of transgression. Ironically, even developmental psychologists have a better 
understanding of how these processes work among adults than among children at this point 
in time. 
 
Note 1  
I use the term “straight” rather than “heterosexual” for the same reason that I use “gay” and 
“lesbian” rather than “homosexual”; it is a term derived from sexual minority communities 
and not a medicalizing term. 
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